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In many developing countries, public programs in the form of food aid
distribution and food-for-work programs are often meant to protect vul-
nerable households from consumption and nutrition downturns by provid-
ing a safety net. Few studies have evaluated the impact of these programs.
Furthermore, households often use a variety of informal mechanisms to
cope with risk, including mutual support and risk-sharing. In this paper
we look into the extent to which food aid helps to smooth consumption
by reducing the impact of negative shocks, paying attention to program
placement e¤ects. Using panel data from Ethiopia, we …nd that despite
poor targeting of the food aid, the programs reduce some of the vulnera-
bility to common shocks via intra-village risk sharing. JEL CODES D91,
I38, O17
1 Introduction
In recent years, the need to develop better safety nets in developing and transi-
tion economies has been generally acknowledged (see e.g.Drèze and Sen (1990),
World Development Report 2000/01). In rural areas of the developing world,
they often take the form of direct transfer programs, via food aid distribution
and public employment programmes with in-kind wages. Despite calls for more
long-term safety nets, often these programmes are still largely relief programmes,
responding to local or national emergencies, even though this may be changing
(Clay and Stokke (1991)). In any case, these programmes are typically meant
to support the poor and vulnerable, to avoid current and future deprivation and
insu¢cient nutrition1.
1Di¤erent terms tend to be used to describe the objectives of these programs. Often, they
aim to promote food security, which can be de…ned as the freedom from the risk of insu¢cient
1The problems with food-based support programs and their e¢ciency in de-
veloping countries has received a lot of attention (for reviews see Ravallion
(1991), Clay (1986), Barrett (2001)). Much of this literature has been concerned
with questions about the programme objectives, their long-run sustainability
and dependency problems (Maxwell and Singer (1979), Ruttan (1993), Stewart
(1998), Barrett (2000)) or the incentive e¤ects of transfers on labour supply,
food production and other productive activities (Sahn and Alderman (1996),
Dorosh et al. (1995), Maxwell and Singer (1979), Maxwell (1991), Maxwell et
al. (1994), Mohapatra et al. (1997), Barrett (1998a), Bezuneh et al. (1988)).
Other studies try to quantify the net transfer bene…ts, taking into account the
opportunity cost of time spent on food-for-work (Datt and Ravallion (1994)).
There is a sizeable literature on the impact of ration systems and supplemen-
tary feeding programmes (Beaton and Ghassemi(1982), Kennedy and Alderman
(1987), Alderman (1991)). A few papers have directly addressed the issue of nu-
trional impacts of food distribution and food-for-work programmes (Athanasios
et al. (1994), Janyne, Strauss et al. (1999)), while some have focused on the
indirect e¤ects, such as on-farm investment (Bezuneh et al. (1988), Bezuhen
and Deaton (1997)).
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the problems related to the
targeting of transfers (Besley and Kanbur (1990), Sen (1995), van de Walle and
Nead (1995)). Building on the success of the Maharastra Employment Guar-
antee Scheme, self-selection based employment schemes are often advocated as
providing a partial solution to these targeting problems (Drèze and Sen (1990),
Ravallion (1991)), even though this may not be without problems either (Bar-
rett (2001), Alderman and Lindert (2001)). Empirical work on rural data has
tried to quantify these targeting issues: are the poor reached (Jayne et al. (1999,
2001), Teklu and Asefa (1999), Clay et al. (1999), Clay (1986), Ravallion (1990),
von Braun (1995)).
To the extent that empirical research has focused on the impact in terms of
welfare, much of this work su¤ers from at least four problems. First, most of
the studies, especially on food aid and food-for-work, focus on whether the poor
are reached or not, without directly evaluating the impact on the livelihoods
of the poor. Secondly, even if they do, they rarely address the issue of the
impact in terms of nutritional risk, and focus only on the direct e¤ect on current
incomes and nutrition, partly due to the lack of longitudinal data that can
document vulnerability and welfare dynamics (Barrett (2001)). Thirdly, and
linked to this, they do not consider the presence of alternative ways of coping
with consumption or nutrition shortfalls, such as via asset depletion and informal
support networks (Morduch (1995), Townsend (1995), Deaton (1997)). The
impact evaluation of the program should take these alternatives into account, for
example given possible important crowding out e¤ects (Attanasio and Rios-Rull
(1998)). Fourthly, they fail to acknowledge the econometric problems related
nutrition, thereby avoiding current and future deprivation. Di¤erent authors use di¤erent
de…nitions. Terms such as ’food security’, ’nutritional risk’ or ’vulnerability’ are used in a
similar sense (Beaton (1987), Morduch (1994), Maxwell (1996), Dercon and Krishnan (2000),
Christiaensen (2000), Barrett (2001)).
2to program placement e¤ects (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) for a classic
treatment). In particular, the recipients of support may receive it due to certain
characteristics, unobserved to the researcher, that also impact on the recipients’
nutrition or consumption outcomes, biasing the results of the impact evaluation.
The key contribution of this paper is that it can deal with all these problems. In
particular, we combine insights and modelling approaches from the risk sharing
and consumption smoothing literature to study the net impact of safety nets
on household welfare, accounting for the econometric problems posed by the
evaluation of program interventions.
Ethiopia provides a useful case-study in this respect. It is one of the poor-
est countries in the world by any indicator. Per capita GDP is estimated at
about 140 US dollars, child malnutrition (stunting) is estimated at well-above
50 percent during the 1990s and adult malnutrition is about 25 percent (World
Bank (1999), Christiaensen and Alderman (2001), Dercon and Krishnan (2000)).
Furthermore, its population is living in highly risky environment: drought is a
recurrent phenomenon, requiring large public responses (as in 1994 and 1999)
or, combined with failing public policy and war, triggering a large scale famine
in 1974 and in 1984-85. Ethiopia is also an important recipient of food aid,
arguably increasingly dependent on it. World Food Programme estimates for
1994-98 suggest that Ethiopia is second largest recipient of food aid in the world
(after Bangladesh). In the 1990s, volumes of food aid accounted for about 5 to
15 percent of production (Clay et al. (1998)). Food aid is largely distributed via
food-for-work programmes - the best estimate puts its share at 63 percent of food
aid, while the rest is largely distributed as direct (free) transfers. Food-for-work
and direct food aid distribution are virtually the only publicly provided safety
net in rural Ethiopia. A few recent studies have documented and analysed the
e¤ectiveness of food aid delivery, uncovering important de…ciencies, although
the focus has largely been on targeting issues (Sharp (1997), Clay et al. (1998),
Jayne et al. (1999, 2001), Barrett et al. (2001)).
The next section will present a theoretical framework to test the impact of a
safety net on households faced with income risk. Section 3 presents the empirical
model, discussingthe way the programme placement e¤ects are handled. Section
5 gives the data used and section 6 the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In order to analyse the impact of the safety net provision, we explicitly want
to take into account risk, intertemporal behaviour and the existence of commu-
nity and household based mechanisms to cope with the consequences of risk2.
For this, let us characterise …rst the behaviour of welfare over time under the
hypothesis that these mechanisms work perfectly. We will then proceed with
discussing how imperfections in these mechanisms will show up in the evolution
2Since for the empirical application, we speci…cally use household level data, we do not
consider intrahousehold issues in this model. For an analysis of these issues in the context
risk using the same Ethiopian data, see Dercon and Krishnan (2000).
3of outcome data. Then, we will introduce a safety net and discuss how the
observed outcomes would be quali…ed by it, focusing on the way the safety net
transfers will a¤ect the household directly, as well as via the community based
mechanisms. To do so, consider a world with missing insurance markets. For
the moment, we allow for credit markets. Let households i maximize intertem-
poral expected utility, with instantaneous utility of individual ui de…ned over
consumption cit: We assume that the household is risk averse (U0
i > 0;U 00
i < 0).
Denote T as the time horizon of the household and s a state of the world (out
of S possible states) with probability ps (
PS
s=1 ps = 1)3. Household face risky
(exogenous) income yit, have a discount rate of ¯ and have access to a risk-












subject to the intertemporal asset constraint, that assets Ait in the beginning
of each period should obey:
Ait = (1 + r) Ait¡1 + yit¡1 ¡ cit¡1 (2)
Assuming no bequest motive (AiT +1 = 0); then this problem results in the
standard permanent income result that expected utilities move in lock step over
time (Deaton (1992)), or, using E as the expectations operator:
u0
i(cit) = ¯(1 + r)E [u0
i(cit+1)] (3)
Equation (3) allows for credit and savings to smooth consumption. The
fact that the marginal utility at t is only equal to expected marginal utility in
t+1 is a re‡ection of the fact that insurance markets are missing. An empirical
formulation of equation (3) would suggest that only shocks to permanent income
would change optimal consumption relative to before - transitory shocks would
be smoothed (Paxson (1993), Deaton (1992)).
Next, assume that the community in which this household lives has a risk-
sharing mechanism in operation, so that mutual insurance is o¤ered to each
other. Given risk-aversion, both agents have an incentive to share risk. The
mechanism is at …rst assumed to be perfectly enforceable, no private informa-
tion exists and it covers I individuals. The scheme provides then a Pareto
e¢cient allocation. Using notation as before, we can write this problem then
as if joint utility function of the di¤erent community members i, weighted by
Pareto weights is maximised subject to a joint income constraint, where the
Pareto weights µi can be interpreted as determining the share each member ob-
tains in the arrangement, allocated by a social planner (Townsend (1994), Udry
(1994), Ligon (1998)). Given these weights, the planning problem can then be
3In the formulation used, income is independently identically distributed. The results on
risk sharing and consumption smoothing can be generalised to stationary Markov processes.
See e.g. Deaton (1992), Ligon et al. (1998), Thomas and Worrall (2000).



















((1 + r) Ait¡1 + yit¡1 ¡ cit¡1) (5)
From the …rst order conditions of this problem, and only considering interior
solutions, the full-insurance result follows, that the relative allocation between
any two households i and j in any period of time t and t+ 1 (ex-post, i.e. after














In other words, whatever state of the world materialised, relative marginal
utilities are equal - with the lack of expectations operators the hallmark of full
insurance (Ligon (1998)). Combining (6) and (3) suggests that the credit which
allowed (3) to be valid is in fact used for the bene…t of the whole community. The
community risk-sharing arrangement can only deal with within-community (or
idiosyncratic) shocks; credit and savings can then be used for community-level
(or common) shocks, resulting smooth consumption both between households
and over time4. Clearly, this is a useful benchmark to discuss credit market
imperfections, problems with the risk sharing arrangement and the e¤ects of
safety nets.
Introducing a safety net would improve outcomes, if only through adding
free resources to the community (which makes it di¤erent from an insurance
system). But the insurance e¤ects are rather subtle. First, consider a safety
net transfer, targeted to someone su¤ering from an idiosyncratic shock. The
transfer would merely reduce the transfers needed within the community to
achieve (6), i.e. it would just crowd out within-community transfers. Suppose
that the transfer were poorly targeted, so that those experiencing the shock do
not receive support. This is not a problem in this case: the transfer would be
allocated according to (6), so that those facing the shock would still bene…t.
Crowding in would be possible. Targeting is irrelevant for outcomes if there
is a perfect risk sharing arrangement5. A safety net for common shocks would
4While providing consumption smoothing, within-village insurance combined with
between-village credit is not enough to yield fully predictable consumption over time for each
household. Besides strong restrictions on utility functions and on the relationship between
time preference and interest rates, it also requires between-village insurance - i.e. (3) is only
valid in expectation.
5In this discussion, it is assumed that the Pareto Weights are assumed to be predetermined
by the agreement, i.e. they do not change for example due to transfers. If public transfers
induce changes in the agreement, then would have to be taken into account, leaving some role
for targeting.
5only crowd out credit and savings to the extent that the transfers deal with
transitory shocks. Permanent shocks are not covered by credit in (3): i.e. the
safety net would mainly add welfareif it provided protection against such shocks.
Examples are common shocks that destroy the asset base, e.g. droughts that
kill livestock herds, earthquakes that destroy property, epidemics and other
’catastrophic’ shocks. In short, abstracting from the overall resource transfer
e¤ect, the safety net would not change outcomes for idiosyncratic shocks since
it would merely crowd out the within-community transfers. It would only a¤ect
the impact of common shocks, to the extent that these shocks are permanent.
Suppose now credit markets are imperfect, so that (3) does not hold. For
example, consider that only collateralised loans are possible. Then it must be
the case decisions on consumption in each period t must obey that:
At+1 > 0 (7)
Adding this constraint to the problem in (1) and (2) results in a standard
modi…cation of equation (3). Let ¸t be the multiplier on this constraint, then
(3) should be rewritten as:
u0
i(cit) = ¯(1+ r)E [u0
i(cit+1)]+ ¸t (8)
If (7) binds, then the lack of credit results in lower consumption at t than
optimal: consumption is less smooth, since only savings can be used for in-
tertemporal smoothing. A safety net now has another potential bene…t: it can
not only help to reduce the impact of permanent common shocks, but also
with transitory common shocks6. Given (6), the other results are unchanged:
since the informal insurance arrangement is assumed to be perfectly enforce-
able, whatever the resources available, the sharing rule is still valid. The issue
of targeting is again largely irrelevant.
Introducing imperfections to therisk-sharingarrangement creates more prob-
lems for the analysis of the impact of food aid. Typically, two problems could
be considered: asymmetric information and enforcement problems. Problems
such as moral hazard central in market-mediated insurance and would also re-
sult in less than optimal insurance. But arguably, this class of problems are less
important in informal systems based on families and neighbours, where moni-
toring is relatively straightforward. Enforcing the arrangement across all states
of nature and over time could be more di¢cult: even though ex-ante, it would
have paid a household to enter the arrangement to insure against downside risk,
but if a good state of the world materialised, the household may be better o¤
to leave the arrangement. Incorporating this problem in a contract to make it
sustainable (self-enforcing) has received a lot of attention in recent years7. Es-
sentially, the problem can be thought of as the model in (4) and (5), but with an
additional constraint, stating that the expected intertemporal utility of staying
6Any imperfection in savings markets would further result in net welfare gains via the
safety net (on this, see Dercon (1999)).
7Coate and Ravallion (1993) consider static contracts, Ligon et al. (1997), Kocherlakota
(1996) and others have looked at optimal contracts in a dynamic context.
6in the arrangement and non-reneging on promises, outweighs in each period the
expected utility of leaving the grouping and reversing to ’autarky’. Using £ and
- to denote respectively whether the household sticks to the arrangement, and
reverts to autarky, this sustainability condition can be written as:
















De…ning the solution to this problem is not self-evident, especially when
savings is possible as well. The solution takes the form of an updating rule on
the Pareto weights, based on the ’original’ Pareto weights µi plus the cumulative
sum of the Lagrange multipliers on the sustainability constraints for person i
(Ligon et al. (1997), Thomas and Worrall (2000), Attanasio and Rios-Rull
(2000)). In particular, let ¹i¿ be the multiplier at period ¿, then the relative













The point is that a binding sustainability constraint for a particular house-
hold willincrease its weight, implying that it needs a higher share in the arrange-
ment than before. The shift in favour of the household is persistent8. Any fac-
tors that a¤ect the sustainability constraint could now have an impact on the
allocation between the agents, resulting in possible less protection o¤ered. Sav-
ings is such an example: since households can now self-insure, it would limit the
scope of mutual insurance, so that relative to imperfect enforceable risk sharing
without savings, some households may have less overall protection (Ligon et al.
(1998))9.
At a basic level, the introduction of a safety net has similar e¤ects as before:
it would help to insure common shocks, while it may even plug the holes left in
terms of idiosyncratic insurance. Targeting transfers for common shocks would
still induce (partial) crowding in, and partial crowding out if targeted to those
facing idiosyncratic shocks. However, the introduction of a safety net can then
also have rather unexpected additional e¤ects that need to be taken into ac-
count. Suppose that it o¤ers insurance for aggregate shocks. Just as in the case
of savings, the e¤ects are ambiguous. Surely it provides an increase in ex-ante
welfare since the impact of aggregate shocks is now reduced, but it may also
a¤ect the sustainability constraints: some may …nd their overall autarky welfare
8Foster and Rosenzweig (2000) exploit this feature to test this model, by noting that past
positive transfers will be negatively related to new transfers conditional on shocks.
9Ligon et al. (1998) show that, if savings is possible within a context of imperfect enforce-
able informal insurance, and given the assumptions of their model, (8) needs to be modi…ed by
adding a term which is a function of the sustainability constraint of the risk sharing arrange-
ment. Ex-ante welfare is improved through savings, since aggregate shocks can be smoothed,
while (observable) savings can show committment to the informal arrangement, but by mak-
ing autarky more attractive, it may reduce welfare by limiting the extent of mutual insurance
o¤ered and received.
7increased su¢ciently that the (imperfect) risk-sharing o¤ered before would even
be cut back, reducing the welfare of others in the mutual support system (At-
tanasio and Rios-Rull (1999, 2000)). Note that protection for aggregate shocks
is potentially causing the reduction in idiosyncratic insurance. Albarran and
Attanasio (2001) present some evidence that suggests crowding out of informal
insurance consistent with this model, using data from Progresa in Mexico. Tar-
geting of aggregate insurance may be a solution, to the extent that those most
likely to su¤er due to the sustainability constraints are only receiving the assis-
tance, i.e. because those they rely on are likely to hit sustainability constraints
if the assistance is untargeted. To the extent that the poor are those who have
su¤ered most shocks in the past, this may be feasible in practice. But just as
with most targeting, the informational requirements are high. Note that poorly
targeted aggregate insurance may induce a reduction in idiosyncratic insurance,
beyond untargeted insurance. Finally, coverage for some idiosyncratic shocks
by a safety net could also have complicated e¤ects. Beyond crowding out some
mutual insurance, it could also reduce insurance for other idiosyncratic shocks,
by a¤ecting the position of households in autarky. Targeting this assistance may
be a way out, but poorly targeted assistance may again make things worse for
the others.
Two other routes would be possible to design safety nets that would not
induce welfare losses or to minimise crowding out of idiosyncratic insurance.
Both involve …ndingways to reduce the incentives of participants to deviate from
the arrangement due to the increase in autarky values. The solution would be
to make the safety net conditional on participation in the mutual mechanism, so
that the safety net would be lost if the household were to leave the arrangement.
The simplest form would be to give the aggregate protection to the mutual
insurance group. However, this would require the safety net operator to be
able to identify the group and monitor its continued existence as a group. If
the group cannot be observed or monitored, an optimal mechanism may be
designed to induce the group to stay together by allowing other group members
to punish deviators by denying them aggregate insurance. Attanasio and Rios-
Rull (2000) discuss some possible mechanisms which could deliver this outcome.
In any case, current practices appear to be far from these mechanisms.
3 The empirical model
The previous section provides a setting to test the key question of this paper:
does the distribution of food aid improve the ability of households to deal with
shocks and in this way improve welfare? To investigate this, it is useful to con-
sider an empirical formulation, similar to the ones used to test the existence of
full insurance in communities and whether consumption is smooth over time.
Recall the key predictions of both models: …rst, the perfect risk-sharing model
suggests that allocations between agents should not be a¤ected by idiosyncratic
shocks, while only common (village level) shocks should matter. Consump-
tion smoothing in the permanent income model implies that only permanent
8shocks should matter, while transitory shocks should not a¤ect the allocation of
consumption. This implications refer to the evolution of marginal or expected
marginal utilities over time and households. Speci…c assumptions about the
utility functions are needed to get similar …ndings in the space of consumption,
some resulting in models in levels of consumption or in logs10. We use a generic
formulation, expressed in logs, linking shocks directly to the evolution of con-
sumption. To start, we can state in general that consumption at each point in
time will be some speci…c function of:
cit = f(Y P
it ;Y T
it ;Y C T
it ;Y C P
it ;Ã it;!C
t ) (11)
in which Y P
it is household permanent income, Y T
it is household level tran-
sitory income, Y PT
it is community level permanent income, Y CT
it is community
level transitory income, while Ãit and !C
t are household and community spe-
ci…c factors in‡uencing how household level allocations follow from household
and community level income. They include factors such as seasonality, time
preference but also, if risk-sharing takes place, the relative Pareto weights and
possibly the history of the support system. The theoretical models discussed in
the previous section have speci…c predictions about the role of di¤erent factors.
For example, the perfect risk-sharing model would predict that the individual
income outcomes in each period would have no e¤ect, controlling for commu-
nity level permanent, transitory income and the household and community level
controls. The permanent income hypothesis would predict that none of the tran-
sitory sources has an e¤ect. The two models together would predict that only
permanent common income shocks would matter. Transitory sources would
matter if the credit markets are imperfect, while individual income would still
have an impact in the partial risk sharing case due to enforcement problems11.
By considering a dynamic model, we can formulate the problem directly in terms
of outcomes of di¤erent sources of risk - events causing changes in permanent
and transitory income. By lack of any speci…c guidance on how to parametrise
speci…cally the model, let us consider that the log of consumption is a linear
function of these events, given …xed and time-variant household and community
characteristics. Let us call the observed risky events S, allowing some to be
causing permanent income e¤ects, e.g. death, disability, landslides while others
cause transitory e¤ects, e.g. illness, rainfall. The shocks can be both idiosyn-
cratic and common. Higher S is assumed to imply higher income. This means





it + ´Xit + µi (12)
10For example, Townsend (1994) uses exponential utility functions, and this yields a model
in levels of consumption; Cochrane (1991) and others have used CRRA utility functions,
resulting in expressions in terms of logs of consumption. Quadratic utilities as in Hall (1978)
result in consumption in the following a random walk over time.
11Strictly speaking this would not be correct when considering the imperfect enforceability
model, where history matters. This can be incorporated by considering time varying Ã and
!C. We will discuss this in the estimation of the model.
9in which Xit capture observable household and village level control vari-
ables linked to income12, while µi are observable and unobservable household
and community …xed factors in‡uencing consumption outcomes, including the
determinants of permanent income. Under perfect (within-village) risk-sharing,
® = ¯ = 0 ,(while ° > 0, and unless credit markets are perfect, ± > 0). Perfect
credit markets would imply that ¯ = ± = 0 ,(while ° > 0, and unless within-
village risk sharing takes place, ® > 0). Unless between-village insurance takes
place, ° > 0. Imperfections in informal risk-sharing arrangements would result
in idiosyncratic shocks to impact on consumption (® > 0;¯ > 0), while im-
perfections in credit markets would result in (at least) ± > 0. Taken together,
positive values for any of these coe¢cients on the sources of risk would be signs
of imperfect smoothing and insurance. Any e¤ect of savings or credit on in-
formal idiosyncratic insurance would similarly show up in the form of positive
coe¢cients on the idiosyncratic risk variables.
To nest di¤erent imperfect outcomes better, it needs to be taking into ac-
count that in an imperfect world savings is typically still feasible. Consequently,
downside transitory risk would in general be harder to cope with than upside
risk. Furthermore, the presence of unobservable …xed e¤ects will potentially
cause econometric problems, so a more familiar formulation of the empirical
model can be obtained by estimating …xed e¤ects, or equivalently, di¤erencing
(12). Using 4 to denote changes between t and t¡1, and distinguishing positive
from negative transitory shocks, we can write:
4ln cit = ® 4 S
P
it + ¯1 4 S
T
itj4ST
it¸0 + ¯2 4 S
T
itj4ST






it ¸0 + ±2 4 S
CT
it j4SCT
it <0 + ´ 4 Xit (13)
in which under imperfect markets ¯2 > ¯1 ¸ 0 and ±2 > ±1 ¸ 0, while the
other expected signs are unchanged from the discussion before.
Equations (12) and (13) are useful to test the impact of a safety net. If food
aid is simply a form of income support system, lifting up incomes, irrespective
of events, then it would show up as a permanent income change (if it is expected
to be permanent) or a transitory income change. If it is a safety net, providing
protection against shocks, then it would show up in change of the coe¢cient on
the di¤erent risk variables. Relative to the counterfactual of no safety net with
imperfect risk-sharing and credit markets, an e¤ective safety net would restore
the perfect credit and informal insurance result (® = ¯1 = ¯2 = ±1 = ±2 = 0),
while even ° = 0 may be achieved. A test of the e¤ectiveness of the safety net
would then be the extent to which the coe¢cients are becoming closer to zero.
The econometric problem arises from possible endogeneity of the program.
To see this, consider …rst the standard approach to evaluating programs. Let
us consider the program e¤ect as a dummy shifter for inclusion in the program
or not (¼it). (In a further version, this will be extended to introduce also the
12The time variant parts of factors determining Ãit and !C
t are also assumed to be captured
by Xit:
10size of transfers, although conceptually they are not much di¤erent.) Equation
(12) can then be rewritten as:








it + ´Xit + µi + ¼FAit (14)
in which ¼ measures the impact of the program - helping to boost consump-
tion in that period or not. The standard program placement program can be
understood as the problem that certain unobservables may be correlated with
whether a person receives the program - i.e. that F Ait = 1 is correlated with
particular µi. One solution in the panel is that the program is not always ob-
served, so a…xed e¤ects estimator of (12) (or equivalently, equation (13) with the
change in coverage of the program as an additional dependent variable) would
both get rid of the heterogeneity and solve the program placement program.
This is the approach we take.
The complication is that it would be consistent with perfect credit and risk
sharing that the impact of FAit on the level of consumption should be very
small! So, …nding no program impact would be consistent with a perfectly
functioning program. Surely, this does not help our test. To assess its impact,
wemust look more directly at the waythe program can a¤ect the consequences of
shocks, i.e. to see whether it reduces the shocks faced by households. To do this,
we will interact negative shocks with the presence of a program - and investigate
whether shocks are insured via the program. Since we are considering food aid
programs, it seems reasonable to restrict us to large common but transitory
shocks (like a drought), although this could be extended (see the econometric
discussion). Introducing such a program in (12) and di¤erencing gives us:
4ln cit = ® 4 S
P
it + ¯1 4 S
T
itj4ST
it¸0 + ¯2 4 S
T
itj4ST










2:FAit: 4 SC T
it j4SCT
it <0 + ´ 4 Xit (15)
where the impact of the program on the household’s ability to smooth con-
sumption is measured by ±
f
2. For the program to be e¤ective, one would expect
¡±2 < ±
f
2 < 0, i.e. negative shocks have smaller e¤ects when the program is
in place. Since the shocks are exogenous, if programs are placed due to some
time-invariant characteristics µi as in (14), (15) does not su¤er from this, since
this heterogeneity is controlled for in this di¤erence model. However, the …nal
complication is that programs may be well be placed due to some time-variant
factors –such as gradual soil degradation due to harsher e¤ects of past droughts,
or in general some other form of marginalisation, or even due to some gradual
shift in political favours to one region, then program placement e¤ects could
still be present (as if there is heterogeneity in (15)). Time-variant heterogeneity
is obviously very hard to address. But if one is willing to assume some structure
to it, then this is possible to be dealt with. In particular, assume that this time
variant heterogeneity enters in equation (15) as a …xed factor (so that in (12), in
the level equation, there is a individual speci…c trend: households get gradually
11better or worse o¤, not captured by observables at t). In that case, running a
…xed e¤ects regression on (15) (’a double di¤erence’) then this would solve any
econometric problem that may be caused by this e¤ect. Note that this assumes
that current common shocks are not the only reason for placing the program. If
this was the reason, then (15) or its di¤erence would not make much di¤erence,
so this will show up in the regressions.
But this is not quite theend of the story: if there is perfect risk sharing within
the community, then, as was argued before, targeted transfers will just be treated
as an individual shock, and distributed among the villagers. Even in imperfect
risk-sharing arrangement, some of the receipts may well be distributed. The
consequence is that simply having a program present in your village or group
may a¤ect the consequences of shocks - i.e. your common shock would be
insured by the others receiving aid. An alternative scenario is also possible: the
transfers given to others in the village may crowd out informal transfers that
they should give to other individuals. So if you receive transfers, you will be
better o¤ due to the program (bad shocks have a smaller impact) but if you
are not receiving them and there is a program in the village, you may be losing
from it, i.e. may the impact of the shock higher. To allow for this, we also
introduce not just whether the household is covered by the program (FAit) but
also whether the village is covered or not (V FAit = 1 or 0). The model to be
estimated is then:
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where we expect a program that has an individual impact to have ¡±2 <
±
f
2 < 0, and where ±
v
2 > 0 suggests crowding out for example linked to enforce-
ment of informal insurance agreements, while ±
v
2 < 0 is evidence in favour of
informal risk-sharing. This model will be estimated, …rst as described above
(which then controls for …xed individual heterogeneity in the levels of consump-
tion) and secondly, by di¤erencing (16), which then controls for time-variant
(trend) heterogeneity in the levels of consumption, as a more appropriate con-
trol for placement e¤ects.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
Ethiopia is an obvious case to study the impact of safety nets on household abil-
ity to keep consumption smooth. It is one of the highest recipients of food aid,
while it is faced with harsh environmental and climatic conditions. Donors and
the government have committed themselves to forming a well-functioning safety
net. The government’s National Policy of Disaster Prevention and Management
12(FDRE, 1993) stated that ’no human life shall perish for want of assistance in
time of disaster’. In the Food Security Strategy (FDRE, 1996) a distinction was
made between food-for-work or other income generating labour schemes (sup-
plementary employment and income schemes), aimed at able-bodied adults,
and targeted interventions for especially vulnerable groups. They cover both
interventions in large scale crisis and programmes designed to reach particular
groups over longer periods. In practice, a very large proportion of interventions
involves food aid. Food aid has long contributed to food supplies in Ethiopia.
This dependence has been exacerbated by the food shortages during the famine
in 1984-85, the increasingly desperate situation in many rural areas in the late
1980s, linked to civil war and political turmoil. The annual volume of cereal
food aid has typically been about 2,000 to 6,000 metric tons per year in the
period 1986-1995, representing about 5 to 15 percent of production. Even in
average years, the volume of cereal food aid in a given region can account for 25
percent or more of total marketed supply of grain, increasing to up to 50 percent
in drought years (Clay et al. (1998)).A substantial portion (over 80 percent in
bad years) of food aid has been used for emergency relief purposes.
Still much of it is distributed via food-for-work programs, but often the
workload is not clear while self-targeting is rarely used, with wages higher than
opportunity costs of time, resulting in more people applying to work than can
be accomodated. In e¤ect, this means that the distinction between food aid and
food-for-work may not be that useful for our purposes. In this version of the
paper, we are not addressing potentially di¤erent impacts.The more important
question for our purposes is to what extent aid assists the poor and vulnerable.
Sharp (1997), who reviewed a large body of evaluation studies as well conduct
several new case studies, found that food aid has in recent years been spread
too thinly over too many areas and too many people. Little evidence of area
targeting can be found. Furthermore, in most cases, participants to schemes are
selected at the community level, but there is a clear reluctance to select some
households while excluding others, so that much larger numbers are involved in
the programmes than what they were intended for. The result is that targeting
errors of inclusion (providing aid to people who are not in the intended target
group) are a greater problem than errors of exclusion (failing to provide aid
to the people who need it most) (p.75). The result is that often too little
aid is provided to the poorest to make much di¤erence. A similar result was
found in the sub-sample of the large nationally representative HICES/WMS
survey for 1995/96. Daniel Molla et al. (1998) found the most important factor
determining access to food aid was simply whether a programme existed in the
area before. Half the food aid distributed went to households with more than
su¢cient food from their own resources . It should be stressed that these types
of …ndings are not uncommon across other developing countries. Nevertheless,
they appear to have encouraged many donors to reassess their activities in these
areas. Subsequent, careful econometric studies of food aid in Ethiopia (Jayne,
Strauss et al.(1999)) seems to con…rm these pattern.
The data used in this paper come from three rounds of the Ethiopian Rural
Household Survey, collected in 1994 and 1995. This is a panel data survey col-
13lected by the Economics Department of Addis Ababa University in collaboration
with the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University. It
covers 15 villages, representative for di¤erent areas across the country, and a
total of 1450 households were interviewed. The attrition rate in this panel is
very low - about 3 percent per year. The survey has detailed information on
households, including consumption, assets and income, as well as the shocks
they faced. Furthermore, it contains detailed information on participation in
free food aid and food-for-work programs.
Consumption per adult equivalent13 (in 1994 prices) is relatively low: about
80 birr on average, which was then about 12 US dollars a day. Using a local
nutriotional poverty line for 2200 Kcal per adult, this suggests about 40 percent
do not get su¢cient calories on average. Shocks are very common, even in this
short period considered and even if on average this was not a particularly bad
period in recent Ethiopian rural history. In about a quarter of the villages, a
serious drought occurred while diseases a¤ected crops and livestock in many
others. An average household would lose several person days a month due to
serious illness (more details are in Dercon and Krishnan (2000)). Ability to cope
with shocks is generally known to be quite limited. Using a qualitative survey,
most households reported many episodes of serious hardship linked to shocks
in the last twenty years, related to drought, illness, policy changes and other
factors. For example, close to 80 percent of the sample su¤ered major economic
hardship due to drought, mainly during the famine of the mid-1980s.
E¤orts have clearly been made to supply the rural population with food
aid. But how e¤ective is it? First, in our sample we have a high percentage of
households receiving food aid or bene…ting from food-for-work in the six months
before each round of the survey: about 20 percent in both round 1 and 3, and
even 39 percent in round 2.However, the spatial and temporal spread is very
diverse. In …ve villages (out of 15) we found always programs present, in three
never while in 7 there was sometimes a programme to disappear afterwards.
Also the coverage in terms of households changed considerably over time. Table
1 gives details of a few villages.
Table 1 Percentage of households receiving food aid per round
in selected villages
village name Round 1 (1994a) Round 2 (1994b) Round 3 (1995)
Atsbi 64 6 52
Geblen 79 97 5
Ankober 0 98 0
Shumsha 96 80 62
Yetmen 0 0 0
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey.
13The consumption data arebased on summingand valuing food and non-food consumption
obtained via own production, the market and via gifts. It is expressed in real terms by using a
consumer price index, using the average household in the …rst round as a base. It is expressed
in adult equivalent units using nutritional equivalence scales based on WHO data for East
Africa. All data issues are discussed in Dercon and Krishnan (2000).
14As can be seen, one village (Ankober) suddenly had a program with virtually
complete coverage, to disappear in the other rounds. In Geblen, the program,
very active before, disappeared. Only in Shumsha, (not far from the tourist
destination Lalibela - a preferred destination of heads of mission an evaluation
teams of donors and NGOs...), coverage was always high, with in round 1, six
agencies identi…ed as giving food aid in one way or another. tables 2 to 4 give
some indication about the targeting of the programme. First, we look at the
whether the poor in preceding period t-1 received the aid or not during the
period between two rounds t and t-1. The poor are identi…ed using a poverty
line based on the cost of obtaining su¢cient consumption to yield 2200 Kcal per
adult and some allowance for non–food. Details are in Dercon and Krishnan
(2000). E¤ectively about 40 percent are poor in each round, although there
is considerable mobility. Ignoring for obvious reasons the data from the …rst
round, table 1 shows that of the about 26 percent of households receiving aid,
more than half were non-poor in round t-1. In short, targeting of the poor it is
not quite succeeding.
Table 2 Is food aid targeted to the poor. Percentage of house-
holds receiving food aid by poverty status
non-poor (t-1) poor (t-1) total (t-1)
no food aid (t,t-1) 52 22 74
food aid (t,t-1) 14 12 26
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey.
Table 3 Is food aid targeted to the poor. Percentage of house-
holds receiving food aid by rainfall experience
worst rains median rains best rains
no food aid (t,t-1) 28 27 21
food aid (t,t-1) 8 2 13
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey.
Table 4 Is food aid targeted to the poor. Percentage of house-
holds receiving food aid by agricultural shock experience
worst shocks median shocks least shocks
no food aid (t,t-1) 27 27 21
food aid (t,t-1) 7 6 12
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey.
Table 3 introduces common shocks: village level rainfall. By dividing the
sample into groups according to whether the rains in the six months preceding a
round belonged toa the lowest tercile (worst rains), middle tercile (median rains)
and the best rain tercile, as well as by whether food aid was received. of those
receiving food aid, most food aid went to those with the best rains, while among
the people that did not receive food aid, relatively more were bad rains in that
15particular period. Di¤erent tables, such as looking at the preceding rains versus
current food aid did not change this picture very much. Finally, in the data we
also have information on overall shocks to crops, including plant diseases and
other idiosyncratic shocks. Households were again divided into terciles by crop
shocks and by receiving food or not, and similar patterns emerge: at least using
simple descriptive statistics, the evidence on targeting of the poor or vulnerable
is not very strong. Of course, a more complete evaluation requires regression
analysis.
5 Results
In this section, we will estimate equation (16) using these panel data from
Ethiopia. The speci…cation used is standard and similar as in Dercon and Kr-
ishnan (2000). This means that the logarithm of consumption per adult equiva-
lent is regressed on individual and common shocks, controlling for seasonality in
prices and labour requirements, and controlling for change in the demographic
composition of the household (including number of female and male adults, sex
of the head). Shocks included are rainfall shocks, idiosyncratic shocks related
to crops, idiosyncratic shocks related to livestock (disease, death) and illness
shocks in the household. In this paper, I only report the variables of interest
(the rest of the results are available upon request). See also Dercon and Krish-
nan (2000) - the e¤ects of the control variables is not much di¤erent from those
in that paper. The di¤erence in speci…cation with this previous paper is (a) the
introduction of a possible impact of the food aid program and (b) a distinction
is now made between better than normal rain (a positive shock) and worse than
normal rain (negative shock), since theory would predict possibly di¤erential
impact. For a test of the e¤ectiveness of the safety net in case things go wrong,
this speci…cation is superior. Table 5 gives the results. The …rst set of results
is for the model controlling for individual (…xed) heterogeneity, the second set
controls heterogeneity in the trend of consumption: The latter will then control
for example for placement e¤ects stemming for placing programs in areas that
facing a relatively higher vulnerability, in terms of ability to cope with shocks
over time.
16Table 5 Regression results: …xed e¤ect regressions explaining the
logarithm of consumption per adult equivalent (errors corrected for
cluster e¤ects).
’…xed e¤ects’ ’double di¤erence’
( …xed heterogeneity) (time-variant heterog.)
coe¢cient t-value coe¢cient t-value
rainfall 1.19 3.68 ** 1.32 7.68 **
rainfall if bad 0.52 3.37 ** 1.04 7.16 **
rainfall bad*food aid 0.04 0.67 0.06 0.70
rainfall bad*village aid 0.06 0.76 -0.29 2.31 *
number of observations 2475 2475
**=signi…cant at 1 percent, *= signi…cant at 5 percent
The regression also includes controls for seasonality in prices, peak labour periods,
sex head, dependency ratio, male and female adults and household-speci…c shocks. See
text and Dercon and Krishnan (2000) for details. ’Rainfall’ is the percentage deviation
from long term average levels in the main rainy season relevant for consumption data,
’rainfall bad’ is the same variable but only for those observations where rainfall was
below the average. The coe¢cient measures then the additional e¤ect on consumption
from bad shocks, as in a model with savings but no credit. ’Rainfall bad*food aid’ is
the previous variable multiplied by whether the individual received food aid - trying
to measure the (di¤erence in) impact of the shock if the household received food
aid. Finally, ’rainfall bad*village food aid’ is the same as before but now the issue is
whether the village received food aid (de…ned as more than 5 percent of households
received some) - testing crowding out or sharing of bene…ts within the village as in a
risk sharing arrangement. Note that the de…nitions apply to the levels model, and the
actual regressions are di¤erence or double di¤erence models.
First, lookingat the results of the regression with controls for individual …xed
heterogeneity, we notice that current levels of consumption are signi…cantly af-
fected by rainfallsuggesting imperfections in insurance and credit arrangements.
Bad rain shocks have a large impact on consumption than better rain, suggesting
that negative common shocks are not well handled. However, in this speci…ca-
tion, both individual food aid and living in a village with a food aid program
has no signi…cant impact - clearly surprising. Note that this controls for place-
ment of programs in areas correlated with …xed unobservable household or area
characteristics. For example, if food aid is systematically targeted to those with
low (or high) consumption, this e¤ect is controlled for in our regression, so this
cannot be the cause of the insigni…cant e¤ects. The second set of results sug-
gest that this was not su¢cient in terms of controls for placement. Once we
control for the possibility that there is time-variant heterogeneity and allow for
placement e¤ects are correlated with this type of heterogeneity, then the results
change: receiving food aid as a household still has insigni…cant e¤ects, but if
food aid is given in a community, then this reduces the impact of the shock
signi…cantly. This is consistent with the presence of at least partial risk sharing
within the community: food aid crowds in community support. This e¤ect is
the only one: the household itself does not seem to bene…t signi…cantly more
17once the e¤ect via the community sharing is accounted for.
The size of the e¤ect gives some indication of the e¤ectiveness of the safety
net. First, an additional bad rainfall shock of 10 percent reduces consumption
by about 23.6 percent. The safety net has some impact, but it is still not
large, especially compared to the scale of the food aid operation in Ethiopia.
Those covered by the safety net still typically face reduction of consumption
by 20.7 percent when a (marginal) bad rainfall shock of 10 percent occurs. In
other words, about 12 percent of a rainfall shock is covered by the safety net.
Finally, comparing before and after controlling for time-varying heterogeneity,
the impact of the program becomes positive on the ability to cope with shocks
from having no e¤ect. This is consistent with program placement in areas that
have a lower ability to cope with these shocks, so that the impact of the program
was at …rst underestimated.
6 Conclusions
The paper has analysed the impact of public support programs on the ability of
households to smooth consumption when faced with negative shocks, taking into
account the presence of informal insurance systems. We used panel data from
Ethiopia, including detailed shock and consumption data, as well as information
on food aid and food-for-work programs to test this. Particular attention was
paid to the possibility program placement e¤ects in evaluation these programs.
The empirical analysis has shown that common shocks in these communities
have large, uninsured e¤ects. Downside risk results in a substantially higher
e¤ect than a positive shock. Food aid does not appear to have a large impact.
In particular, we did not a signi…cant reduction of vulnerability to bad rainfall
shocks via a direct e¤ect on the recipient of the food aid. This may well be
related to poor targeting so that aid rarely is given at times when it is really
needed. Descriptive statistics appear to con…rm this. However, if there is a food
aid or Food-for-Work program in the community the household is living in, then
we …nd a lower sensitivity to downside risk (reducing the impact of downside
risk by about a 12 percent). While this is not very high, it is signi…cant. Finally,
even though there are concerns about the targeting the appropriate individual
households, it appears that programs were placed in more vulnerable areas.
This could be detected from the way the time-varying heterogeneity seems to
have a¤ected the estimates.
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